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Celebrating the re-election of Barack Obama as a win for GLB equality or denouncing the focus on
marriage rights as honormative misses the point. Both approaches obscure what actually happens
in local sites where authority is exercised. Looking into the cracks and crevices of regulatory
apparatuses generates a more complex picture. In examining contradictory rules on sex
classification, for example, it becomes clear those contradictions often reflect different state
projects, such as security, distribution, reproduction. Construing the election as a victory for gay
rights or for homonormativy elevates grand concepts—marriage, the state—over the quotidian
actions that regulate life.
President Obama might have been returned to office, but many believe that gay, lesbian, and
bisexual community was the real winner of the 2012 election. November 6, 2012 was “a big, gay,
historic night!” writes the editor-in-chief of The Advocate, the US’ preeminent gay news organ.
“Marriage won at the ballot box for the very first time, and we reelected Barack Obama, the most
pro-equality president in our country’s history.”1 When the president came out in support of same-
sex marriage in May of 2012, the GLB community’s perennial position of political abjection—that
of the partially unrequited lover to the Democratic Party—came to an end. The President
explained in an interview with ABC news, “For me personally it is important for me to go ahead
and affirm that I think same-sex couples should be able to get married.”2 According to exit polls,
lesbian, gay, and bisexual voters comprised 5 percent of voters. And 76 percent of them voted for
Barack Obama. The straight vote was evenly split—49 percent for Obama, 49 percent for Romney
—leading some commentators to assert that the “gay vote” won Obama the election.3
For the first time in history, the GLB community had a candidate with the right positions on all
the key issues. Obama was not only in favor of marriage equality, he also supported the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, the rights of GLB parents and the recognition of GLB
families. Although Romney had supported many forms of gay rights when he was governor of
Massachusetts, in his more recent iteration as Republican presidential candidate he had moved
far to the right on social issues: he opposed same-sex marriage; he thought non-discrimination
laws should be left to the states; he was certainly not going to exercise mercy on the deportation
of queer undocumented partners of US residents as officials at the Obama administration’s
Immigration Control and Enforcement had promised. Unlike previous election cycles, which pitted
Democratic candidates indifferent or vaguely supportive to GLB rights against a decisively “pro-
family” Republican candidate, it was simply Obama the good versus Romney the bad. The gay
community—at least the community as limned by GLB national advocacy and media institutions
—was all in.
Of course, that the winner of the presidential election backs all the essential elements of the
gay rights agenda does not mean that all or any of these issues will be favorably resolved in the
next four years. It will still be difficult, if not impossible, to get the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act through the Republican-dominated House of Representatives. There’s little the President can
do to change discriminatory family laws governing adoption and parental recognition that remain
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on the books in many states, aside from using the power of the bully pulpit. If marriage equality
were to be imposed on the states by the federal government, it would be the doing of the Supreme
Court, not Congress. (Though the Obama administration did stop defending the constitutionality of
the Defense of Marriage Act two years into the president’s first term.) It’s far from likely that the
Court will find bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional, given its current composition. Still, the
election results seem to sound the eventual death knell of state-sponsored discrimination against
GLB people.
A Very Brief History of the Concepts of Heteronormativity,
Homonormativity, and Homonationalism
For some, however, Obama’s victory and the increasing likelihood that the Democratic Party will
make good on its promise of equality to GLB people is not something to be celebrated. Gay
marriage, the passage of non-discrimination laws that include sexual orientation, the end of the
military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, the repeal of sodomy statutes—all these, from the vantage
point of queer politics and queer theory, reflect a hopelessly liberal politics of inclusion. Indeed,
the ascendancy of the gay rights movement and the wholesale incorporation of its agenda into
mainstream political discourse possibly signal the end of radical queer politics. In the early 1990s,
queer politics was to be the vehicle for challenging what queer theorist Michael Warner called
“heteronormativity,” and defined as “the institutions, structures of understanding, and practical
orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent—that is, organized as a sexuality
—but also privileged.”4 Heteronormativity is not the same as heterosexuality, just as queer is not
the same as lesbian and gay. Warner and Lauren Berlant explain that through heteronormativity:
[a] complex cluster of sexual practices gets confused, in heterosexual culture, with the love plot of
intimacy and familialism that signifies belonging to society in a deep and normal way….A whole field
of social relations becomes intelligible as heterosexuality, and this privatized sexual culture bestows
on its sexual practices a tacit sense of rightness and normalcy. This sense of rightness—embedded
in things and not just in sex—is what we call heteronormativity. Heteronormativity is more than
ideology, or prejudice, or phobia against gays and lesbians, it is produced in almost every aspect of
the forms and arrangements of social life: nationality, the state, and the law; commerce; medicine;
and education; as well as the conventions and affects of narrativity, romance, and other protected
spaces of culture.5
Confronting heteronormativity wasn’t centered on challenging discrimination or demanding
toleration. Instead, it was to be, in Warner’s words, a “new style of ‘queer’ politics that, no longer
content to carve out a buffer zone for a minoritized and protected subculture,” would “challenge the
pervasive and often invisible heteronormativity of modern societies.”6 The queer attack on
heteronormativity rejected the limited liberal aspirations of ending state-sponsored homophobia
and installing principles of toleration in its place. Indeed, for queer theorists of the 1990s, it was
almost as if the ontological revolutionary priority previously assigned to the working class was now
attached to queer people. For Warner, “[o]rganizing a movement around queerness also allows it to
draw on dissatisfaction with the regime of the normal in general. Following Hannah Arendt, we
might even say that queer politics opposes society itself.”7 In the heyday of the 1990s, of ACT
UP and Queer Nation, for Warner and others, coming to queer self-understanding became a kind
of revolutionary act.
Despite early queer theory’s Foucauldian approach, which emphasized historicizing the politics
of desire and the shifting social arrangements that sustained particular sexual formations, a sort of
essentialism inflected its account of queer politics, even queer subjectivity, as inevitability radical.
Warner and Berlant announce, “Because homosexuality can never have the invisible, tacit,
society-founding rightness that heterosexuality has, it would not be possible to speak of
‘homonormativity’ in the same sense.”8 In the span of fifteen years, however, the sense of radical
queer inevitability had disappeared; by 2003 it was indeed possible to imagine homosexuality
integrated into normative social arrangements. In The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural
Politics, and the Attack on Democracy, Lisa Duggan identified a “new homonormativity” in gay
politics “that does not challenge heterosexist institutions and values, but rather upholds, sustains,
and seeks inclusion within them.”9 Instead of working to dismantle the institutions that structure
inequality—marriage, the military, the family, the workplace—the gay and lesbian political
imaginary had shrunk to seeking “a place at the table,” mere formal equality and recognition.
Writing about what they fear to be an emerging “queer liberalism,” queer theorists David Eng,
Judith Halberstam and Jose Munoz worry that the “contemporary liberal demands of a nationalist
gay and lesbian US citizen-subject petitioning for rights and recognition before the law” reflects the
reconstitution of gay rights as “a type of reactionary (identity) politics of national and global
consequence.”10
Post 9/11, homonormativity morphed into homonormative nationalism, or “homonationalism.”
In Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times, Jasbir Puar identifies “collusions
between homosexuality and US nationalism” that lead to the incorporation of good gay and even
queer subject “into the body of the normalized nation.”11 The extended remarks on same-sex
marriage that President Obama made when he announced his personal support for same sex
marriage provides a very clear example of Puar’s point. President Obama told the ABC reporter:
Over the course of several years, as I’ve talked to friends and family and neighbors, when I think
about members of my own staff who are incredibly committed in monogamous, relationships, same-
sex relationships, who are raising kids together, when I think about those soldiers or airmen or
marines or sailors who are out there fighting on my behalf and yet feel constrained even now that
don’t ask don’t tell is gone because they’re not able to commit themselves in a marriage, at a certain
point I’ve just concluded that for me personally it is important for me to go ahead and affirm that I
think same-sex couples should be able to get married.12
Another example: as part of the campaign for marriage equality, the nation’s biggest gay
political organization, the Human Rights Campaign, ran full page ads in publications with the
image of a gay man holding a picture of his partner, a flight attendant who had died on American
Airlines Flight 11. The large headline text quoted the surviving partner’s testimony before a Senate
committee: “The terrorists killed people not because they were gay or straight—but because they
were Americans.”13 For Puar, this homonormative nationalism is amplified even more by rhetoric
that constructs the United States as a nation of “sexual exceptionalism”—a place of tolerance for
queer folks—in contrast to the homophobic cultures that are also incubators of “the terrorist.” As a
result, she argues, the cultural and legal normalization of homosexual/queer subjects is linked with
the “national and transnational political agendas of US imperialism.”14 Homonationalism, then,
provides an alibi for the necropolitical violence perpetrated on racialized and sexualized others
inside and outside of US borders.
The conceptual apparatus of heteronormativity, homonormativity, and homonationalism
produces a different reading of the 2012 election results. Supporters of GLB rights view President
Obama’s victory and the votes for same-sex marriage in three states (and against a ban on same-
sex marriage in a fourth) as an unquestionable good. From the perspective of the queer anti-racist
anti-imperialist left, however, the “big gay historic night” of November 6 exemplifies a
homonormative politics that seeks not redistribution but recognition. The promise of equal sexual
citizenship in this moment of extreme income inequality, of the erosion if not gradual dismantling
of the social safety net, of the “hyper-incarceration” of the prison industrial complex,15 and of
record-high rates of deportation is not a cause for celebration. What does it mean that gay rights
are to be delivered by an administration bent on fulfilling George W. Bush’s legacy of dismantling
the tradition of habeas corpus? Can we celebrate the legal normalization of homosexuality by an
administration that assassinates individuals through “targeted” extrajudicial killing? As queers in
the US are increasingly comfortable being open about their sexuality in public without fear of
harassment, violence or discrimination, public life in some parts of Pakistan constricts in the face
of “a wave of terror” created by drones hovering overhead. One person interviewed for a human
rights report on drones recounted, “God knows whether they’ll strike us again or not. But they’re
always surveying us, they’re always over us, and you never know when they’re going to strike and
attack.”16 Since President Obama took office, there have been 300 such strikes. He’s the only
sitting US president whose “kill list” has been publically acknowledged.17 There may be no
necessary connection between the Obama administration’s support for GLB equality and the
injustices it has wrought in the name of the “War on Terror.” Even the advancement of the
neoliberal agenda does not absolutely require the abolition of state-sponsored homophobia. But
neither are these convergences entirely coincidental. They have, no doubt, provided a good deal
of progressive cover to the Obama administration.
De-fetishizing the State
While the queer critiques of homonormative and homonationalist agendas are more complex than
the GLB mainstream’s celebration of recent victories, the emphasis on the interpellation of queer
subjects through national biopolitical projects tends to frame the discussion around activities
regulated by the federal government (commerce, war, immigration, national security, etc.) and
national discourses of American identity (marriage and family). In doing so, this scholarship tends
to overemphasize a unity of intention on the part of state actors and to imagine the “the state” as
far more monolithic than it is. Similarly, while gay rights advocates have been forced to battle
official homophobia at the state and local levels, they seek a singular, all powerful, champion to
resolve the problem once and for all at the federal level. One act of Congress could end
employment discrimination everywhere; one Supreme Court ruling could rid us of the patchwork
quilt of laws and constitutional amendments on marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnership.
The problem is this: both perspectives naturalize the state, and attach certain properties to “it”—
a totalizing logic, an ordered hierarchy, a comprehensive rationality, a unity of purpose and
execution. Both assume the executive, as a single branch, produces non-contradictory policy
outcomes. Both nationalize the state by overstating the capacity and power of the federal
government compared to local state actors. Both situate the federal policy as the key target,
either as the resolver of the problem or the cause of the problem. Both assume that the actual
policy outcomes are always intended. Both assume a universalist rationality—good or bad—to
“the” state’s actions. That marriage has become the focal point for both the GLB rights movement
and the critique from the queer left demonstrates the hold of these assumptions. Gay rights
advocates assume that inclusion in the institution of marriage will precipitate widespread social
acceptance. On the other side, marriage has become the absolute bête noire of radical queer
theory and activism. The 2006 “Beyond Marriage” statement, authored by Duggan and others,
serves as the rallying cry for queer left activists.18 It’s not much of an overstatement to say that,
for both the mainstream GLB community and the queer left, politics has been reduced to taking
positions for or against same-sex marriage. Finally, both positions move too quickly into the land
of “ought.”
Celebrating the victory of Obama as a win for GLB equality or denouncing the focus on marriage
and formal equality as expressions of homonationalism/homonormativity misses the point.
Fetishizing a generalized idea of the state—the conceptual state—obscures what is actually
happening in the local, micro, particular sites where public authority is being exercised. Mariana
Valverde reminds us that it’s important to heed Foucault’s “warnings against taking abstract
concepts as more real than the practices that constitute them.”19 As one of those abstract
concepts, Foucault suggests, the state may be, at most, “no more than a ‘composite
reality.”20Perhaps this a little counterintuitive to political theorists, but in looking into states and
their effects, an ethnographic approach might be more useful than a purely theoretical one.
Accordingly, we might remember Gilles Deleuze’s admonition that a concept “should express an
event rather than an essence.”21 Or Bruno Latour’s advice to “resist the idea that there exists
somewhere a dictionary where all the variegated words of the actors can be translated into the few
words of the social vocabulary.” Rather than trying “to settle any given controversy,” Latour
recommends “the best solution is to trace connections between the controversies themselves”
[italics in original].22Moving too quickly (or at all, in Latour’s rigorous and labor intensive method of
social inquiry) from the concrete to the conceptual, and framing local particular problems in
relation to the already-agreed upon umbrella categories of the social analyst, reifies ideas,
concepts, and abstractions and gets in the way of understanding what’s actually going on.
Governmentality, Not Laws or Elections
I’ll provide a brief example of the mundane technologies of governmentality, one that I hope will
provide a bit of concrete context for the argument. While working on this article, I got a call from a
woman in Colorado, someone I’d never met but who tracked me down with the hope that I could
help her sort out a situation involving her marriage and the Social Security Administration. She
and her husband had been married eleven years, but the officials at the Social Security
administration wouldn’t acknowledge their marriage. Without that recognition, neither would be
eligible for spousal social security benefits. Her husband’s original birth certificate identified him
as female, but after “transitioning,” he had procured other documents that classified him as male.
She wanted to find out what had to be done to change his sex designation in his records. The
Social Security Administration, a federal agency, does allow transgender people to change their
sex classification.23 I knew all about her quandary because I’ve spent a lot of time looking into
rules for sex classification for the purpose of marriage. I’d also changed my own sex classification
in my “numident record” at the SSA and written an auto-ethnography on that experience. But I
couldn’t help her. Even were the SSA to change his sex classification to M, that would not
guarantee either of them benefits after the death of the other because the SSA’s decision on sex
classification is not dispositive when it comes to the distribution of benefits. Whether that
marriage is valid for the purpose of benefits distribution depends on state law. In fact, the field
manual for SSA workers uses the phrase “not clear” several times in its section on the validity of
“transgender marriages.” Field officers are advised to submit the claim to their Regional Chief
Council for a legal opinion. The validity of a marriage might depend on the jurisdiction the marriage
was performed in; where the spouse lived in at the time of their partner’s death; whether a party to
a marriage “transitioned” before or after the marriage; the case law on intestate succession in the
state the parties lived in, were married in, or where the surviving spouse resides; or it might
depend on any number of particular combinations of those individual facts.24 All that is to say—
there’s not a lot of certainty in that policy document. When it comes to securing the connection
between the individual’s sex and the M or F attached to their record in a particular context, it’s not
only turtles all the way down—there are actually quite a few piles of turtles.
In fact, rules for sex classification are notoriously contradictory. When some individuals cross
borders, walk into a government office to apply for benefits, get a driver’s license, go to jail or
prison, sign up for selective service, try to get married, or have any interaction with any state
actor, the sex classification of some people can and often does switch from M to F, or from F to
M. Even within a single jurisdiction, almost every particular state agency—from federal to
municipal—has the authority to decide its own rules for sex classification. And, to complicate
matters even more, both state and federal judges have found that one’s sex classification for one
social function may not hold for others. The lack of a uniform standard for classifying people as
male or female means that some state agencies will recognize the new sex of people who change
it, some will not. For most people, this lack of uniformity doesn’t present a problem. For others, it
does: an individual can be both M and F, depending on the agency. In New York City the same
person might be housed in a women’s shelter, segregated with men in prison, be given a “pink”
bus pass by one agency, have an M on her birth certificate, and an F on her passport—and be
denied access to both men’s and women’s residential drug rehabilitation facilities. If such a thing
as “transnormativity” exists, it would be very hard to assimilate into the categories when the
definitions seem so capricious and arbitrary, and which shift depending on so many factors.
Policies and decisions on sex classification may be arbitrary (in that they’re backed by a
decision, not a fundamental truth) but they’re not necessarily capricious. The different metrics for
sex are telling, and much is lost when those differences are seen as irrational contradictions,
vestiges of social structures long past. While these policies may appear to be contradictory,
they’re not. In fact, if we let go of the idea that there is any “there there,” any whatness, to sex
apart from what any particular state actor say it is, the contradiction evaporates. State decisions
about the M or the F stamped on documents or coded in records become the only true thing we
know. Everything else is in motion. In dropping the idea that there is any clearly delimited integrity
to the thing we call “sex” when we refer to an M or F on an identity document, it becomes easier to
see what the category does in particular instances. And what sex does depends on what state
actors need it to do. As I explain elsewhere, different sex classification criteria often reflect
different state projects—recognition, security, surveillance, distribution, reproduction. What seem
to be contradictions in sex definition—across jurisdictions, between agencies, and at different
times—are simply the consequences of the fact that “the state” is not a singular entity but
multiple, does not do one thing, but many, is not produced through one process, but many.25
In 2011, a transgender rights group sued the City of New York, claiming that its policy for sex re-
classification on birth certificates is “arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, and otherwise
unlawful.”26 (The policy requires individuals who want to change the sex classification on their
birth certificates submit evidence of genital surgery; the trans rights advocates wanted a different
metric, one based on gender identity, that was backed by the medical community.) The suit
accused the city of putting forth a number of contradictory “irrational” rationales in the justification
for its particular rules for sex classification. In defending its policy, lawyers for the city disputed
the claim that its policy was irrational. They countered that “[t]he existence of different approaches
to similar problems does not render an agency’s rule irrational.”27 These lawyers understood what
advocates did not—that sex classification serves different purposes at different city agencies—
and that to put in place a single policy on sex reclassification across all city agencies would
undermine the particular political rationalities at work in those policies. And it’s those particular
political rationalities that ought to receive more critical attention.
To some, the 2012 election stands as a turning point in the quest for GLB rights; to others, it
marks the continuation of a politics bent on increasing the power and reach of a national security
state and eroding the living standards—measured by economic security, health, and mortality
rates—of the population. However, construing the election as presenting a choice between Obama
the good and Romney the bad, or as a battle between Obama the not-so-great and Romney the
bad, elevates grand narratives and concepts—marriage, the state—over the thousands of ongoing
and quotidian decisions that regulate life. That simplification is understandable. It’s certainly much
easier to talk about same-sex marriage than to do archival excavations of applications of SSA
policy, to delve into the cracks and crevices of the regulatory state apparatuses. But in an article
on Foucauldian theory of the state, Thomas Biebricher and Frieder Vogelmann suggest that to
produce a “critical perspective on the state” one has to “step outside” the state’s own discursive
formation. They argue that we need to produce “unwieldy knowledge” that “does not function
according to the logic of politics,” that “neither fully embrace[s] nor simply reject[s]” governmental
rationalities.28 Becoming swept up in the romance, or tragedy, of the electoral narrative, gets in
the way of understanding the minute technologies of governance that regulate our lives.
It’s not my intention to fall down the rabbit hole and to permanently foreclose making the
impossible and yet necessary jump from the “is” to the “ought” on questions of gay rights,
homonormativity, and sex classification. But it is my contention that we need to understand at a
much more historical and granular level what states are, what they do, and the effects of particular
policies on sex. For any particular state apparatus at a given moment, the apparently minor issue
of the criteria for sex classification might be supporting more weight than we might imagine;
calling for its reform might involve more changes than we had anticipated, and consequently
engender more resistance than initially seems reasonable. So it’s important to understand in each
particular context, no matter how apparently mundane, what sex is doing and how that doing is
imbricated with other systems of social stratification. Universal solutions calling for uniform criteria
for sex classification across all forms and levels of government (the liberal agenda) or for the
complete elimination of sex as a legal identifier across the board (the more radical position)
suggest that sex does the same thing in every location. Molar, large-scale accounts of “sex” and
“the state” depend on assuming a sameness to sex or a singular rationality to state actors,
decisions, and projects. We don’t know what a politics of resistance would look like until we
understand what it is we’re resisting.
Paisley Currah
Paisley Currah is Professor of Political Science at Brooklyn College and the Graduate Center of the City University of
New York. His current research examines apparent paradoxes in state rules on sex classification. He has written
widely on the transgender rights movement in the United States. Currah is the author of United States of Sex (New
York University Press, forthcoming), and the co-editor, with Monica J. Casper, of Corpus: An Interdisciplinary Reader
on Bodies and Knowledge (Palgrave, 2011). He is the general co-editor of Transgender Studies Quarterly, a new
journal from Duke University Press. Paisley can be reached at PCurrah@brooklyn.cuny.edu
Acknowledgment
I thank Steven Johnston, Lisa Jean Moore, Tara Mulqueen and Ella Myers for their comments on an earlier draft of this
article.
Notes
1. Matthew Breen, “Editor’s Letter: Being Pro-Equality Is No Longer Risky,” The Advocate. Accessed online
at http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2012/11/07/editor-chief-says-election-proves-being-pro-equality-no-longer-
risky, November 20. Voters in Maine, Maryland, and Washington voted in favor of gay marriage laws; voters in
Minnesota voted against a constitutional amendment that would ban same-sex marriages.
2. President Barack Obama, interview by Robin Roberts, ABC News Video, May 9,
2012, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/video/obama-sex-marriage-legal-16312940.
3. Micah Cohen, “Gay Vote Proved a Boon for Obama,” New York Times, November 15, 2012.
4. Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, “Sex in Public,” Critical Inquiry, no. 24 (Winter 1998): 548. Adrienne Rich’s
“Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence” (Signs 5, no. 4 (1980): 631–660 and Gayle Rubin’s “Thinking
Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality” (in Carole Vance, ed., Pleasure and Danger (New York:
Routledge, 1984): 267–319) are important precursors of the concept of heteronormativity.
5. Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, “Sex in Public,” Critical Inquiry, no. 24 (Winter 1998): 554–555.
6. Michael Warner, “Fear of a Queer Planet,” Social Text, no. 29 (1991): 3.
7. Michawl Warner, “Introduction,” in Michael Warner, ed. Fear of a Queer Planet (Minneapolis: Minnesota University
Press, 1993), xxvii.
8. Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, “Sex in Public,” Critical Inquiry 24 (Winter 1998), p. 549.
9. Lisa Duggan, The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy (Boston:
Beacon, 2003), 50.
10. David Eng, Judith Halberstam, and Jose Munoz, “What’s Queer about Queer Studies Now.” Social Text 23, nos. 3–
4 (2005): 1–17.
11. Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham, North Caroline: Duke University
Press, 2008), 46–47.
12. President Barack Obama, interview by Robin Roberts, ABC News Video, May 9,
2012, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/video/obama-sex-marriage-legal-16312940.
13. See Anna M. Agathangelous, M. Daniel Bassichis, and Tamara L. Spira, “Intimate Investments: Homonormativity,
Global Lockdown, and the Seductions of Empire,” Radical History Review 100 (Winter 2008): 125.
14. Puar, p. 9.
15. Loïc Wacquant, “Racial Stigma in the Making of America’s punitive state,” in G. Loury, ed. Race, Incarceration, and
American Values (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 59.
16. On habeas corpus, see Jonathan Hafetz, Habeas Corpus After 9/11: Confronting America’s New Global Detention
System (New York: NYU Press, 2011), 238–257. On the question of drones, see Scott Shane, “Election Spurred a
Move to Codify US Drone Policy, New York Times, November 24, 2012. See also International Human Rights and
Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law, Living Under
Drones: Death, Injury, And Trauma To Civilians From Us Drone Practices In
Pakistan (2012), http://livingunderdrones.org/living-under-drones/NYU report.
17. Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” New York Times, May
29, 2012.
18. “Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic Vision For All Our Families and Relationships,” July 26,
2006, http://www.beyondmarriage.org.
19. Mariana Valverde, “Genealogies of European States: Foucauldian Reflections,” Economy and Society 35, no. 1
(February 2007): 160.
20. Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller, eds. The Foucault Effect (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 103.
21. Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations 1972–1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 14.
22. Latour, Reassembling the Social (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 48, 23.
23. “Changing Numident Data for Reasons other than Name change,” Programs Operations Manual System, Social
Security Administration, instructs SSA field officers thus: “Sex-Operation: Applicant must submit a letter from his or her
surgeon or the attending physician verifying that the sex change surgery was completed. All documents must clearly
identify the NH.” NH is the acronym for Numident Holder; Numident is a short form of Numerical Identification System.
24. POMS General GN 00305.005, “Determining Marital Status”
25. For accounts of different, competing and contradictory rationales for sex classification systems, see Paisley
Currah and Tara Mulqueen, “Securitizing Gender: Identity, Biometrics, and Gender Non-conforming Bodies at the
Airport,” Social Research Vol. 78, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 557–582; Paisley Currah and Lisa Jean Moore, “‘We Won’t
Know Who You Are’: Contesting Sex Designations on New York City Birth Certificates,” Hypatia 24.3 (Summer 2009):
113–135; Paisley Currah, United States of Sex: Regulating Transgender (New York: New York University Press,
forthcoming).
26. Berkley et al. vs. Farley, Petitioners Opening Brief, Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York
(March 17, 2011), 17.
27. Berkley et al. vs. Farley, Respondents’ Memorandum of Law, Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of
New York (July 15, 2011), 64.
28. Thomas Biebricher and Frieder Vogelmann, “Governmentality and State Theory: Reinventing the Reinvented
Wheel?,” Theory & Event 15, no. 3 (2012), doi: 10.1353/tae.2012.0031.
Copyright © 2012 Paisley Currah, Steven Johnston and The Johns Hopkins University Press
